Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.     

Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist

Complementary slackness of a pair of dual linear programming problems implies the remark of Sotomayor (2003) that assignment games have singleton cores only when multiple optimal matchings exist.The author thanks Marilda Sotomayor, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. This paper was finished when the author was visiting University of Rochester. JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D58     

家族企业制度安排演化的博弈分析

家族企业制度安排是保证其持续成长的内在基础，而缺乏系统的制度安排是目前我国家族企业主要弊病之一。本文运用演化博弈论的基本原理分析了家族企业制度安排的演进过程，具体论证了确立家族企业制度安排的必要性。     

窜货的成因及其对策研究:基于博弈论的视角

在我国企业的分销渠道建设中往往会遇到窜货现象。它是现代市场营销中经常遇到的一种行为，这种行为对渠道成员和产品制造商的伤害极大。对窜货现象进行剖析后，我们可以看出，产生窜货的原因多种多样。很多学者都对窜货现象的形成原因作了分析并撰写了文章。他们对窜货的形成原因进行分析时大多是从产品、价格、分销和促销这四个方面进行分析的。本文在对窜货的形成原因进行分析时应用博弈理论对窜货现象进行了分析并在分析的基础上提出了如何预防和避免窜货现象的对策。     

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly

This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies.     

中国外汇储备投资组合选择——基于外汇储备循环路径的内生性分析

本文从中美两国经济的本质性差异出发,通过刻画中国外汇储备对外投资的"循环路径",构建了包括央行、金融市场和实体经济的斯塔克尔伯格及古诺模型,进而模拟出中国外汇储备对外投资对本国经济的间接贡献、合意的外汇储备投资组合,以及最优外汇储备投资规模。研究结果表明,中国外汇储备投资于美国风险资产的规模将影响外汇储备间接转化为美国对中国FDI的比例。同时,中国央行外汇储备规模及投资策略对危机时期的反应不足。改变外汇储备投资收益的主要方法包括降低居民的相对风险回避系数,通过政策引导促进居民消费,以及大力发展中国金融市场,降低对美国金融市场的依赖程度。     

生态工业园企业合作非正式契约的博弈分析

企业间稳定的合作关系是生态工业园顺利成长的前提条件．要保证这种合作关系就必须有强有力的制度保障。新制度经济学理论提出将长期契约用来代替纵向一体化经营，同时将长期契约分为正式契约和非正式契约。由于正式契约的非完备性和未来的不确定性，提高了它的实施成本，因此，非正式契约在规范园区企业行为方面提供了强有力的保证。本文对防止园区企业机会主义行为的非正式契约进行了博弈分析．着重用不完全信息下的动态博弈理论阐释非正式契约运行的内在机理，并对如何规范园区企业间合作关系提出了建议与对策，以期有助于生态工业园的健康成长。     

府谷治污怪招的理论分析

地方保护主义严重存在于我国环境保护过程中，造成这一状况的原因主要是环境保护法律制度不健全、环境保护机构设置不科学和国民的环境保护意识不强。本文就此指出了改变现状的措施：强化国民环境意识、完善环境立法和改革环境保护体制。     

Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement

Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.      

公共选择视角:论组织制度的宽放效应

在组织中,因利益、文化、能力等差异形成的不同利益群体,为博弈各自最大利益所实现的群体共同利益点是所有利益中最小共同点,它是组织为实现一定政治、经济利益目标所确定的最低约束标准和必须实施的强制性要求,是组织中最大范围内的最小认同.当组织为实现更高目标而将制度向某些群体行为倾斜时,不同利益需要群体将与组织倾斜制度不能在最大范围内实现最小认同,使得制度或成本极高或效率极低或极不公平,导致制度出现宽放效应.